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THE FREE SPEECH SAFEGUARD FOR LABOR
PICKETING
By IRA SCHLUSSELBERG
On June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire, the ninth state
to do so, ratified the Constitution, the birth of the United
States of America and its use of the new Federal System was
all established fact. Because the framers were confident that
the Courts of the new nation would interpret the Constitution
in the "light of reason," they remained resolute in the belief
that the people would be safeguarded from legislative and
executive tyranny. This soon proved to be an empty theory,
and on December 15, 1791, the states adopted the "Bill of
Rights," the initial ten amendments to the Constitution. The
first one forbids the Congress from making any laws which
would abridge the freedom of speech or of the press. It is this
amendment and its implied counterpart in the Fourteenth
Amendment as a safeguard against state encroachments, with
which we are primarily concerned herein.
Since that time, the legal sources of the United States and
of England have been enriched by statutes and by decisions
which defined, expanded and often temporarily limited the
rig-ht to free unrestricted discussion. The widest scope ever
enjoyed by this right has been authority to every person to
freely discuss any topic of interest, restricted, in peace-time,
only by the bounds of reasonable comment and public order.
From 1791 to 1937 the statutes and decisions had so
broadened the right of free speech, that there existed an almost
limitless freedom of expression.'
One of the outstanding situations in which this right was
restricted, even in 1937, was in the case of labor picketing. By
that year the courts had, but for a very few, universally
advanced to the point where it was established that the labor-
"A.B., New York University; LL.B., C o 1 u mb i a University.
Formerly connected with Columbia Law Review. Address: Riegel-
man, Strasser, Schwarz & Spiegelberg, 160 Broadway, New York.
'Restricted by N. Y. Penal Laws (Laws of 1909, c. 88) sees. 160,
161 on criminal anarchy; secs. 720, 721, 722 on disorderly conduct;
secs. 1341, 1342 on criminal libel.
L. J.--4
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ing man possessed the right to use the weapons of strike and
peaceful primary boycott so long as he sought a lawful gain.
2
The minority of courts, however, held picketing to be unlawful
per se, in full respect for state statutes and local ordinances
which had been held to be constitutional although they dras-
tically curtailed the right to peacefully picket.
Even those courts which permitted the use of the weapon
of peaceful picketing in furtherance of a lawful strike, were
quick to retract that permission upon the slightest provocation.
'Where the employer could show that the strike had continued
to no avail for a period of time or that he had replaced the
strikers with non-strikers, the lawfulness of the strike would
be terminated and the court would proceed to enjoin the
picketing.
Since the states and not the National Government had
jurisdiction to determine questions affecting the lawfulness of
the purpose of the strike, many courts, 3 terming as prima facie
torts, strikes, boycotts, and the practices therein employed,
required the striker to excuse his conduct. Unless the striker
could shoulder this burden of proof, his activities were doomed.
The animosity of the courts, reaching its peak about 1922, 4 made
it extremely difficult for Labor to justify its conduct in such
situations. In 1935, after many years of constant agitation,
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act, establish-
ing as public policy a favorable attitude toward labor, unionism,
and other labor activities.
Only since the preceding decade has the judicial distrust
of labor, based mainly upon the decisions of the five previous
decades, begun to melt into a stream of friendliness and help-
fulness toward Labor.
In order to better understand the picketing-free speech
doctrine as formulated by the United States Supreme Court
since 1937, it would be beneficial to first view the law concern-
ing libelous coercive publication prior to that year.
When the act complained of consists of such misrepresenta-
2A "lawful gain" included improved hours, wages, and condi-
tions of employment.
Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497; See LAIDLER,
BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE (1913).
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184 (1921). Taft, C. J. wrote the decision.
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tion of a subject that it tends to injure the proprietor, the
offense is simply a libel or slander. In this country the Courts
have with great unanimity held that they will not interfere by
injunction, but that the injured party must rely on his law
remiedy. , However, when the attempt to injure consists of acts
or words which operate to intimidate and prevent the customers
of a party from dealing with, or laborers from working for
him, the acts have, with equal unanimity in this country, been
enjoined. In one case it is an injury to a man's business by
libeling it; in the other lie is prevented from pursuing it, by
for-e, threats, and other like means. While damage may be as
great in one case as in the other-probably with different con-
sequences to the order and peace of the community-the courts
have strangely determined upon entirely different remedies.,
The view is taken that suits of this character are not suits
to enjoin a slander or a libel, but to enjoin "verbal acts" the
effect of which is to injure a person's property by coercing
others, through fear of loss to themselves, to refrain from having
any relations with him. It is said that the issuance of an
injunction to prevent such acts does not infringe upon the Con-
stitutional protections, which declare that every person may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments, being responsible
only for the abuse of that right, and that no laws shall be
enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the free-
do1 of the press.-
It has been urged that a boycotting circular is a libel, and
sinve courts of equity will not enjoin a libel, publication of such
a circular cannot be stopped. Such a defense may not be inter-
p(sed, however, when the acts or the words are accompanied
by threats, express or covert intimidation, or coercion, and the
accomplishment of the purpose will result in irreparable injury
'The cases are collected in 32 C. J. 179.
"Couer D'Alene Consol. and Min. Co. Inc. v. Miners' Union of
Wardner, 51 Fed. 260 (1892).
, Gompers v. Bucks Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Shine v. Fox
Bros. Co., 156 Fed. 357 (1907), cert. den. 210 U. S. 432 (1908); Seattle
Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1905); Jor-
dahl v. Hayda, 1 Cal. A. 696.
Also note Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389; Maryland Lodge v. Adt,
100 Md. 283; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294; Sherry v. Perkins, 147
Mass. 212; Matthews v. Shankland, 25 Misc. 604 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1898);
McCormick v. Local Union 216, 32 Oh. Cir. Ct. 165; Cooks Local
Union v. Papa George, 230 S. W. 1087.
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to and the destruction of property rights.s In such case it is
no longer a mere publication of a libelY
On the other hand there are decisions holding that the
issuance of such an injunction violates not only the above-
mentioned constitutional provisions but also the Due Process
Clause.' 0
This theory maintains that the two propositions, (a) abso-
lute freedom to say and write whatever one desires ol any sub-
ject, together with the responsibility therefor, and (b) prevent-
ing any such freedom when it oversteps certain hazy bounds,
cannot co-exist."
Numerous cases have held a mere notification to prospective
customers that a certain person or establishment is unfair, to
portend a threat or intimidation, in which case it constitutes al
enjoinable boycott. 12
The better view, however, and the one adhered to by the
majority of jurisdictions, sees a publication that a party is "un-
fair" not constituting, in itself, a threat or intimidation. In
the absence of a showing that it was intended as such, the pub-
lication will not be enjoined.13 It has been decided by these
Courts that the use of the words "Unfair to Organized Labor"
,will not be enjoined. However, the use of expressions which
convey covert implications calculated to defame or intimidate
will be enjoined. Nevertheless, where the object sought to be
attained is unlawful, injunctions have been issued to restrain
the bannering of a plant as "unfair" where the sole purpose
is to induce the public to refrain from patronizing that business.
Today, it is generally held that members of a Union may
use, in aid of a strike, peaceful argument and persuasion to
I Cases are collected and discussed in 32 C. J. 167.
'Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497.
"No exception is allowed when the defendant is financially
responsible, Truax v. Bisbee Local 380, 171 Pac. 121 (Arizona); Ex.
parte Tucker, 220 S. W. 75 (Texas); Marx Jean Clothing v. Watson,
168 Mo. 133; Lindsay v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264.
1 An excellent expression of this theory is found in Marx Jean
Clothing v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133.
' The term "unfair" as used by Labor, means that the one so
designated is unfriendly to Labor or refuses to recognize its rules
and regulations. Steffes v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 136
Minn. 200; Gompers v. Bucks Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911). This is
discussed at length in Part Two (to be published in Nov., 1945, Ky.. L.
J.). "Hotel News Co. v. Leventhal, 137 N. E. 534 (Mass.).
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induce persons having, or who might have, beneficial business
relations with the employer to abstain from dealing with him.
This is permitted although the Union's purpose in so doing is
to injure the business and constrain the employer to yield to
their demands. Acts of this character are no longer enjoined.
Labor organizations have the right to appeal to the community
and request the withholding of patronage from one who does
not give fair compensation to labor.14 Such publicity must not
carry an intimation that the stranger will likewise be subjected
to loss of patronage if he disregards their appeal. 15 This pro-
viso is necessary to prevent the issuance of an injunction be-
cause of the application of the doctrine of "invalid secondary
boycott."
Courts often enjoin publicity which is plainly false and
fraudulent. It has also been held that an attempt by a union
to hold an employer up to public condemnation by the use of
misleading statements as to the origbi and scope of the con-
troversy, and thereby force him to yield or risk impairment
and loss of the good will of customers on which his business
rests, is a wrong for which a court of equity would grant redress
by injunction."' Similar rules are adopted where the Union
circulates a list of unfair manufacturers with which it desires
the retailer, to whom the list is given, not to have business. 17
"Parkinson Co. v. Santa Clara County Building Trades Council,
154 Cal. 581; Robinson v. Hotel Employees' Local, 35 Idaho 418; Ellis
v. Journeyman Barbers International Union of America, 194 Iowa
1179, 191 N. W. 111; Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers of
America, 28 N. Y. S. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Cohen v. United Garment
Workers, 35 Misc. 748 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1901); Martin v. McFall, 65
N. J. Eq. 31 (1903).
", McCormick v. Local Union 216, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. 165; George
Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 72 N. J. Eq. 653;
Authorities cited in Perfect Laundry v. Marsh, 120 N. J. Eq. 508
(1936).
' In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act
in concert when the signal is published, gives the word "Unfair," or
"We Don't Patronize," or some similar expression a force not in
keeping with the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any
possible rights of speech which a single individual might have under
such circumstances. "They become verbal acts and are as subject to
injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is un-
lawfully damaged." Martin v. McFall, 65 N. J. Eq. 81 (1903); Seattle
Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. N. D. Col. 1905).
" State v. Stockard, 77 Conn. 227 (1904); Beck v. Teamsters'
Union, 118 Mich. 497 (1898); Fink v. Butcher Union, 84 N. J. Eq.
354 (1915); Branson v. I. W. W., 30 Nev. 270 (1908); Brace Bros.
v. Evans, 5 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. 163 (1888); Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protec-
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The most telling blow to the use of the "Unfair Lists," or
the very wide publicity given to alleged "Unfairness," was
struck decades ago by the United States Supreme Court in the
now famous Danbury Hatters Case,ls when it awarded a manu-
facturer treble damages under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
because the conduct of the Union in widely distributing such
lists was "in restraint of trade." This decision led to the partial
discontinuance of the use of such lists by the American Federa-
tion of Labor.' 9
However, as the years advanced, the courts became more
lenient, and in 1934, in Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers'
Union,20 the court, after discussing whether or not certain signs
stating the usual theme, that "This Employer Is Unfair to
Union Labor," were to be called fraudulent, allowed the signs,
although the only act of the employer was his refusal to dis-
charge an old and faithful employee who did not join the
Union.2 1
Although until the latter part of the nineteenth century it
was considered a tort to induce another to cease working for a
tion Lodge, 77 Vt. 294 (1905); Rocky Mtuntain Bell Telephone Co.
v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 (C. C. Mont. 1907).
' Unfair lists. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908). For a later
development in the same case see Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522
(1915). On the same subject see Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range
Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911). Cf. U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Hyslop, 39 F. (2d)
228 (N. D. Iowa, 1930).
"Some courts have recognized that a threat to withdraw pat-
ronage of unfair goods or services is no less proper than a with-
drawal itself, the validity of which few cowrts doubt. Holmes, J.
in Vehalahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896) said: "As a general
rule, even if subject to some exceptions, what you may do in a cer-
tain event, you may threaten to do-that is, give warning of your
intention to do in that event, and thus allow the other person a
chance to avoid the consequences."
?6 Fed. Supp. 164 (D.C., E.D., Mich. 1934).
"The Court said, at page 172:
".... the statements on these signs to the effect that the plaintiff
is unfair, fairly interpreted, should be construed as meaning, and
intended to mean, that as a result of a disagreement between the
parties, the Defendants considered Plaintiff unfair and that such
alleged unfairness was the cause and subject of a labor dispute
between them and the Plaintiff, to which dispute they were
giving publicity. The very fact that it is a labor dispute indicates
that there is disagreement and conflicting views .... the court
in construing this statutory provision cannot split hairs on the
question whether or not Plaintiff is 'fair' or 'unfair' toward labor.
.... federal courts are prohibited from interfering with a full
and free advertising of those conflicting views."
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certain employer, it has been conceded that, since 1900, an in-
junction will not lie to restrain workers, in the furtherance of
a lawful strike, from using peaceful persuasion and arguments
to entice other workers to join the strike. This is the rule under
the Clayton Act.22
For the same reasons that an injunction will not lie to re-
strain striking employees from persuading other workmen to
quit the service of their employer, an injunction will not lie to
restrain strikers from using such arguments to induce other
workmen not to accept employment from the employer against
whom the strike is in effect,2 3 provided that the strike is lawful
and the persuasion used does not amount to coercion.
2 4
' See Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers' Indus-
trial Union, 8 Fed. Supp. 209 (N. J. 1934) in which no employee of th6
plaintiff was a member of the Union and the Union-defendant was
only engaged in a unionization campaign.
Persuasion too long and persistently continued may itself be-
come a nuisance and its use a form of unlawful coercion. Otis Steel
Co. v. Local Union 218, 110 Fed. 689 (C. C. Ohio 1901); Rogers v.
Evarts, 17 N. Y. S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
In every case where the right of persuasion is sustained, it is
because in the end the employee exercises his own free will. Tunstall
v. Stearns Coal Co., 192 Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911).
The person whom it is sought to persuade must be willing to
listen. No person has a right to impose upon another argument or
persuasions against the willingness of that person to listen. Obstruct-
ing a listener by following or dogging his footsteps is not permissible.
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184,
42 S. Ct. 72 (1921), where Taft, C. J. shows the need for strikers to
have the right to publicize their strike. He says, at page 209:
"The Strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful eco-
nomic struggle between employers and employees as to the share
or division between them of the joint product of labor and capi-
tal. To render this combination at all effective employees must
make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful
to have as many as may be in the same community united,
because in competition between employers they are bound to
be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the
neighborhood."
"Aluminum Casting Co. v. Molders' Local 84, 197 Fed. 220
(W. D. N. Y. 1912); Jones v. Van Winkle Gin Works, 131 Ga. 336;
Johnson Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. Cas. 393, 24 Hun. 489
(N. Y. 1881); Robinson v. Hotel Employees' Local, 35 Idaho 418;
McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, where the court said:
"The persuasion that the law permits is such as appeals to
the judgment, the reason or sentiment and leaves the mind free to
act of its own volition without duress."
"It has been held that sending cars through the streets carry-
ing placards announcing the existence of a strike long after the
termination of the strike, is enjoinable. Steinhart v. Tagen, 207 Mass.
394. See (1940) 25 WASH. L. R. 611.
See, on lawful and unlawful strikes in general, Toledo R. R. v.
Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730 (C. C. Ohio 1893); Barnes v. Berry, 156 Fed.
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When Congress enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the
protection of Labor was expected. However, the state and
federal courts, being hostile to many of Labor's methods, mas-
sacred the "weak protective provisions of the statute. "5 Seeing
their expectations. frustrated by the courts, Labor groups
brought pressure to bear upon Congress, resulting in strongly
worded Labor provisions in the Clayton Act of 1915.2 13 The new
statute was hailed as "Labor's Bill of Rights," Samuel Gompers
of the A. F. of L. calling it the "Cornerstone of the freedom
of American Labor."
The basic Labor provisions of the Clayton Act are found
in Sections 6,. 19 and 20. The last of these is pertinent to our
discussion and reads:
"No such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
person . . . from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means to
so do; or from attending at any place where any such person may law-
fully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
information or from peacefully persuading any person to work or
abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ
any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or per-
suading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do . . .
Unfortunately, the courts never fully carried out the Labor
provisions of the statute, and in time leaders decried the Clay-
ton Act ahnost as much as they had at one time decried the
Sherman Act. Agitation began anew for the enactment of an
72 (C. C. Ohio 1907); Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App.
Div. 244 (1st Dept. 1916); Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed.
563 (C. C. Mo. 1903).
Compare, Thomas v. Cincinnati R. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. Ohio
1894); Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. Div. 7 (1st Dept. 1903) where the
object of the strike was to force a breach of a contract.
' For a full discussion of the materials and cases which arose
under the Sherman Act, see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Iron Molders Union v. Allis-
Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908); Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); also Berman, Labor & the Sherman
Act (1930); Boudin, Sherman Act (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 1283, 1319;
Cavers, Labor v. Sherman Act (1941) 8 U. of CHI. L. REV. 246.
' Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323; 38 Stat. 730 (1915).
The effect of the Clayton Act is analyzed in Hellerstein, Picket-
ing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 N. C. L. REV. 158; FRANK-
FURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) c. IV.
See also discussions in (1921) 6 MINN. L. REV. 252; (1922) 31
YALE L. J. 408; (1922) 10 CAL. L. REV. 237; (1923) 27 A. L. R. 360,
(1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 322.
Amidon, J. in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414
(D. C. N. D. 1923) discusses the Clayton Act in detail. See also
SLESSER & BAKER, THE LAW OF TRADE UNIONS, pp. 217-219.
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effective federal safeguard for the rights of Labor. Although
the succeeding- Congresses saw many such proposals, none ever
were enaeted.
7
Finally Senator Norris and Representative LaGuardia
jointly proposed a bill which became law in 1932. The Norris-
"; The great need for an enforcible protective statute is shown
by an interesting passage found in the Senate Reports of the debates
on the Norris-La Guardia Bill. Sen. Rep. No. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932), 7 to 18.
"An injunction in a labor dispute was issued in the District
Court of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa
on the 29th day of March, 1930. The Defendants in this case
were not allowed to tell anyone that a strike was in progress.
They were not allowed to give any publicity in any way to the
fact that a strike existed. They were not allowed to tell anyone
that the complainant required its employees to sign the 'yellow
dog' contract. In other words, their mouths were absolutely
closed and free speech was forbidden. They could not, without
violating this injunction, have sought advice from an attorney.
The son could not be allowd to seek advice from his own father.
And if the defendants violated this severe decree, they would be
liable for contempt of court, which means that they would be
tried for an offense made illegal by the judge-an offense con-
sisting of an act which would be perfectly lawful under the
laws of the state where the controversy existed. They were not
only forbidden to violate this judge-made law, but, in case they
did so violate it, they would be tried by the man who made the
statute. They would not be allowed a trial before a jury of their
peers-a privilege granted to the vilest of criminals. It has long
been recognized by students of law and government that the
power to make law and the power to enforce law should be
separated as a protection against tyranny. To prevent executive
tyranny, the legislative power has been carefully separated
from the executive power in our scheme of government and to
prevent judicial tyranny, it is equally necessary to preserve the
separation of the legislative power from the judicial power. It
is amazing to realize that in the last 40 years there has
developed in the American Courts the practice of writing a
special law to fit an individual case by judges in issuing labor
injunctions; and that thereupon the judge, who himself wrote
the law, has undertaken to prescribe the penalty for its viola-
tion and to punish the violator without permitting the accused
to enjoy a trial by jury or even to insist upon a trial before
another judge. It cannot be successfully claimed that the courts
have not written into these injunction cases a new law of labor
disputes, fitting the law to each particular case, and then enforc-
ing this new law made by the court. It is difficult to see how
any civilized people could indefinitely submit to such tyrannical
procedure. It is not difficult to understand how such cruel laws,
made not by the legislature but by a judge upon the bench,
should bring our Federal Courts into disrepute. Neither is it
difficult to see how such injunctions violating the conscience of
civilization, should frighten persons against whom such injunc-
tions are issued into desperation. What free American citizen
is willing to submit to the violation of his sacred rights of human
liberty and freedom?"
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LaGuardia Act 2s declared that the public policy and the
National "intent," required the safeguarding of the rights of
Labor. This statute no longer left it to judicial conjecture to
determine the intent and policy of the Nation toward Labor.""
Among other things, Section 4 of the statute prohibits the
use of an injunction to restrain such acts as patrolling, speak-
ing and advertising, not involving fraud or violence, which
would publicize a Labor dispute. 30 (As will be pointed out in
Part Two, this use of "Labor Dispute" in the federal statute
and its state analogues, led to interpretative conflicts in the
Courts.) 3 1
'Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90; 47 Stat. 70 (1933), 29 U. S. C.
101-115 (1940).
"The abuses of liberty by labor injunction are discussed in
SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CASES (1935);
BRISSENDEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1933); TODES, THE INJUNCTION
MENACE (1932); Norris, The Injunction in Labor Disputes (1932)
16 MARQ. L. REV. 157; MACCRACKEN, STRIKE INJUNCTIONS IN THE
NEW SOUTH (1931). Also interesting are a few earlier reports.
Gregory, Government by Injunction (1898) 11 HARV. L. REV. 487;
Rosenblum, The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes (1919) 4 ST.
Louis L. REV. 18; Ralston, Government by the Injunction (1920)
5 CORN. L. Q. 424; FREY, THE LABOR INJUNCTION: AN EXPOSITION OF
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE AND ITS MENACE (1923); Sayre,
Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682; Witte, Social Con-
sequences of Injunctions in Labor Disputes (1930) 24 ILL. L. REV.
772.
Section 4 reads:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunc-
tion in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute
to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts in-
volved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in
promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do
any of the acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of
the acts heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing with-
out fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of
any such undertaking or promise as is described in Section 3
of this Act."
"3 Numerous states have enacted Anti-Injunction Statutes
modeled after the "Norris-La Guardia" Act. COLORADO STAT. (1935)
c. 97 No. 76 et seq.; CONNECTICUT GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1939) No. 1420e
et seq.; IDAHO CODE (Supp. 1940) No. 43-4A101 et seq.; INDIANA
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In proceedings under the statute, before enjoining the La-
bor activity, the court is required to find specifically that all
of the following exists:
(a) unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and
will be continued unless restrained;
(b) substantial and irreparable injury to property will be
inflicted unless restrained;
(c) there is no adequate remedy at law;
(d) public officers cannot or will not protect the com-
plainant;
(e) greater injury will result to complainant by a refusal
of an injunction than will result to the defendant by
issuance of the injunction.
What was meant by Congress when it used the term
"unlawful acts" has never been entirely decided. The Supreme
(ourt has said that it may not stop acts which were free of
breach of peace, violence, fraud, and otherwise unlawful. 
2
One Federal Judge stated that the Norris-La Guardia Act
was meant "to take the Federal Courts out of the business of
STAT. (Burns, 1933) No. 40-501 et seq.; LOUISIANA GEN. STAT. (Dart,
1939) No. 4379.5 et seq.; MARYLAND CODE (1939), art. 100, No. 65
et seq.; MASSACHUSETTS LAWS (Supp. 1940) No. 214-9a et seq.;
MINNESOta STAT. (Mason Supp. 1940) No. 4260-1 et seq.; NEW
JERSY STAT. (Supp. 1941) No. 2:29-77-1 et seq.; NEW YORK CIVIL
PRAC. (Cahill, 1937) No. 876-a et seq.; NORTH DAKOTA LAWS (1935)
c. 247; OREGON Corvip. LAWS (1940) No. 102-913 et seq.; PENNSYL-
VANIA STAT. (Purdon, 1941) No. 43-206a, et seq.; UTAH REV. STAT.
(Supp. 1940) No. 49-2A-1 et seq.; WASHINGTON REV. STAT. (Rem-
ington Supp. 1940) No. 7612-1 et seq.; WISCONSIN STAT. (1939)
No. 103-51 et seq.; WYOMING REV. STAT. (Supp. 1940) No. 63-201
et seq.;
See Shinnar & Co. v. Lauf, 36 F. Supp. 709 (E. D. Wis. 1941).
For definitions of terms used in the Act and in the similar state
acts, see: Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Local, 109
P. (2d) 600 (Ore. 1941); Shively v. Garage Employees Local, 6 Wash.
(2d) 560 (1940); Bond Stores, Inc. v. Turner, 258 App. Div. 769
(3d Dep't., 1939); Nicholaus v. Doe, 175 Misc. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1940) app.
dismissed, 261 App. Div. 1020 (1941); Mlle. Reif. v. Randau, 166 Misc.
247, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Safeway Stores Inc. v.
Retail Clerk's Union, 184 Wash. 322 (1935); Fornili v. Auto Mechan-
ics' Union, 200 Wash. 283 (1939); May's Furs & Ready-To-Wear v.
Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331 (1940); American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
"See discussions in (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 1227; (1937) 6 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 474; (1937) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 137; (1938) 22 MINN.
L. REV. 271.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
granting injunctions in Labor disputes, except where gross
fraud or violence are present.'"33
The cases under the Norris-La Guardia Act refused to con-
sider as unlawful per se, the traditionally illegal acts of second-
ary boycotts and mass picketing. It is reasonable to conclude
that false bannering may no longer be considered a fraud, and
that disturbances of physical property which the local police
are able and willing to control, should not be mistaken for the
violence required by the Act. 34
Since the passage of the Act, the number of injunctions
issued against employees and unions engaged in a Labor dispute
has been drastically reduced. There is, however, a wide loop-
hole in the Act. The prohibition pertains only to a "Labor
dispute." 'Many courts have continued to issue injunctions in
borderline cases by narrowly defining "Labor disputes,"
thereby holding that the facts before the court did not consti-
tute a "Labor dispute" and could be enjoined. 35 A discussion
of the most recent developments in picketing must make men-
'Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
" (1938) Wisc. L. REV. 170; Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323
(1938); American Furniture Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Union, 222 Wis. 338.
See discussions of the Lauf case in (1938) 36 MicH. L. REV. 1146;
(1938) 13 IND. L. J. 516; (1938) 16 N. C. L. REV. 411; (1938) 86 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 784; (1938) 24 VA. L. REV. 684.
For the various ramifications of the Norris-La Guardia Act see
Bushnell v. Zukor, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 79 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1941);
Brook-Maid Food Co. v. Goldberg, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 572 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Wallace v. Internatl. Assn. of Mechanics, 155 Ore. 652 (1936); McKay
v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union, 16 Cal. (2d) 311, cert. den.
313 U.S. 566 (1941).
" New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Groceries, Inc., 303 U.S. 55a
(1938), Accord, Lifshitz v. Straughn, 261 A.D. 757 (2d Dept. 1941);
Cf. Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
1939); Beck Shoe Co. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421 (1935).
This case is discussed in (1938) 5 U. OF Cml. L. REV. 689; See
(1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 217; (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 784; (1938)
26 GEO. L. J. 1026; (1938) 36 MICH. L. REV. 1146; (1940) 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 980.
The New York Anti-Injunction Act is discussed in Baillis v.
Fuchs, 283 N.Y. 133 (1940). See also May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear,
Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331 (1941); Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y.
390 (1937); Luft v. Flove, 270 N.Y. 640 (1936); Busch Jewelry Co. v.
United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N.Y. 150 (1940).
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ti, n of the "Handbill Ordinances" and the fundamental cases
thereunder. 36
The typical handbill ordinance prohibited the distribution
of advertising literature (usually on the public streets) without
a license.3
7
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held, as recently as 1938,
that "advertising" as used in the ordinance, is not limited to
niotices for commercial purposes. 38  Therefore, a handbill dis-
tributed by a Union to further its strike aims, would be pro-
hibited unless a license were first obtained from the official
empowered to grant or refuse such license at will.
In Lo'cll v. City of Griffin,m3 Amy Lovell had distributed
a religious pamphlet without the license required by ordinance.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority of the Court,
overruled the conviction on the ground that MNiss Lovell's acts
were protected from impairment by the cloak of Freedom of
Spee'h and of the Press, and, in the absence of disorderly con-
duct, could not be restricted.4"
"' Questions arising from the handbill ordinances are ably treated
in Lindsay, Council and Court, The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939
(1941) 39 MICH. L. REV. 561. The outstanding cases on the point are
collected therein and in 22 A.L.R. 1484.
Also of note is American Municipal Association, Ordinarces Reg-
ulating The Distribution of Handbills, "Introduction" (1934) (Report
No. 96).
7 This is discussed at length in 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) sec. 956. See also Jarrett and Mund. The
Right of Assembly (1931) 9 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REV. 1; (1939) 12 So.
CAL. L. REv. 466.
" Commonwealth v. Kimball, 299 Mass. 353, 356 (1938), handbill
inviting passerby to a free play produced by a Union.
Cf. Rochester v. Parr, 165 Misc. 182 (Rochester City Court, 1937),
holding that handbills, urging workers to join a Union, are advertis-
ing, but that their distribution did not establish that the distributors
engaged in the occupation of "bill posting and distribution" were
within the application of the ordinance. See also Conflicting Deci-
sions on Commercial Character of Union Leaflets (1938) 6 INT. JUR.
AssN. BUL. 102 and (1938) 7 INT. JUR. ASSN. BuL. 30.
'"303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
"'The Court said:
"Freedom of speech and of the press are protected from
infringement by Congress in the first amendment, and are among
the fundamental personal rights which are protected by the
fourteenth amendment from invasion by state action. (Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359;
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697; Grosjean v. American Press
Company, 297 U.S. 233.)
"Such a statute must only apply to distribution which is in-
consistent with orderly conduct or misuse of streets. This one
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In Schneider v. Sta4e of New Jersey,41 the majority opinion
cites approvingly the words of Hughes in the Locell case, and
admits that the conduct of those using the streets may be regu-
lated for the prevention of disorder and to keep secure the use
of the streets for traffic. However, in exercising this police
power, the authorities must not restrict the use of the streets for
public discussion. Justice Roberts goes to the extreme when he
claims that a person, in exercising his liberty, may stand in the
middle of the thoroughfare, so long as he does not interfere with
the rights of others. Of course if it is found to be administra-
tively possible, the city can punish those who actually throw
papers into the streets.
From these two cases it is seen that the basis of attack on
the "Handbill Ordinances," which was to foreshadow the recent
Supreme Court decisions in the picketing cases, was that such
ordinances abridged the Constitutional guaranty of free speech
and a free press, part of the Bill of Rights of the state constitu-
tions.
4 2
A case before a lower New York Court impliedly gave this
view as early as 1921.43  While distributing circulars opposing
the Ku Klux Klan, the defendants had been arrested under a
city ordinance which forbade such acts on the streets. The
lavgitage of the ordinance had been clearly violated, but the
court, in releasing the defendants, said:
"... the ordinance in question was never meant to prevent
the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and busi-
ness advertising matter, and the circular in question does not come
is invalid as hurting the liberty of a free press. The liberty of
the press is not confined to papers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been his-
toric weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of
Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.
The Press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."
308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939), Roberts, J. writing for the
majority. The Schneider case is similar in situation to the Lovell
case.
'2 A valuable discussion is found in Fuller, The Supreme Court
Looks at Some Handbill Regulations (1940) 5 LEG. NOTEs Loc.
GOVT. 128; (1940) 35 ILL. L. REV. 90.
Also, see the cases noted in (1940) 24 MiNN. L. REV. 570; (1939)
8 INT. JUR. ASSN. BUL. 56; (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 531 and 1067;
(1940) 39 MicH. L. REV. 149.
"People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, 135 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1921),
Tully, J.
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within that category. It would be a dangerous and un-American
thing to sustain an interpretation of a City ordinance which would
prohibit the free distribution by a body of citizens of a pamphlet
setting forth their views . ... "
A new phase of injunctive relief was presented by the suc-
cessful petition for an injunction in the case of Hague v C. I.
0.11 Mayor Hague, of Jersey City, had been enjoined by the
federal ourts from prohibiting a C.I.O. mass meeting in a pub-
lie park. The Supreme Court held that such a denial of the
City's facilities to a meeting of a peaceful group violates the
civil rights of such group, and that to safeguard these rights,
there must be a guarantee of the peaceful use, for public dis-
eussion, of suitable facilities.
4 5,
The United States Supreme Court has stood steadfast in
oposition to any abridgement of the right to free speech so long
as the exercise of that right in no way interferes with the public
peace. The Court has repeatedly maintained that the freedoms
of speech and of assembly were to be inviolate unless they ran
contra to the greater right of the community, that of public
peace and security. 40  Very few of the cases, however, involved
labor picketing.
4 7
The maintenance of the public peace and quiet is considered
more essential than the individual's right to free speech and
assembly. Therefore, when the public assembly or the speech of
an individual or group, less than the entire community, will in-
-307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). (Complainant based his
right upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871.)
"For a thorough consideration of this case, the general field of
handbill distribution and use of the streets for speaking, see (1939)
37 Mici. L. REV. 609; (1939) 38 MICH. L. REV. 57; (1940) 39 MICH. L.
REV. 284.
Also, see Deutsch, Federal Equity Jurisdiction of Cases Involv-
ing Freedom of the Press (1939) 25 VA. L. REV. 507. Interesting is
(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 257.
Cf. E% Parte Neill, 32 Texas Cr. 275 (1893); Ex Parte Harrison,
212 Mo. 88 (1908); Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler, 58 Misc. 325
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908); Star Co. v. Brush, 104 Misc. 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1918), aff'd 185 App. Div. 261 (1918).
'An excellent discussion is found in (1939) 8 INT. JUR. ASSN.
BUL. 1. This emphasizes the jurisprudential "heirarchy of rights and
obligations," i.e., that the duty to safeguard the public* peace and
welfare is a higher and more vital one than is the duty attendant
upon the safeguard of an individual's right to Free Speech and to
Assembly.
'"'For discussions of the abuses of the labor injunction, see FREY,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1923).
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jure or affect the community's right to peace, that speech or
that assembly must bow before the more vital right. In such
way have speeches or assemblies probably tending to riot been
prohibited without violating rights protected by the Constitu-
tion.S
If the speech proposed to be delivered at Jersey City by the
leaders of the C. I. 0. in the Haguie case, would reasonably tend
to incite to riot, it could be correctly prohibited by the municipal
authorities.
A parallel theory is used by many courts when they refuse
to restrain picketing and other labor weapons unless and until
physical conflicts are created. Once the violence arises, its
causes must be removed to safeguard the higher right of the
community, the public peace and welfare. 49
There is, however, a restriction placed upon this "Public
Peace Theory;" and, in fact, made an integral part of the theory
itself by the Lovell case, and heavily underscored by Justice
Roberts in the Schneider case.50
The restriction does not permit a state to use its duty to keep
the streets clean and free of litter as justification for an ordi-
nance which prohibits a person. rightfully on the streets from
handing literature to any person willing to receive it.51 Those
who actually throw the papers upon the streets may be punished.
Most municipalities, by ordinances, make it a misdemeanor to
litter public places. The police power may not, however, be
used as a coverall under which otherwise lawful and peaceful
activities are prohibited. The cleaning of the streets is an inci-
dent to good government and one which the municipality must
undertake. It has been found, especially in the larger cities,
that administratively it is simpler to furnish employees to clean
the streets than to undertake the tremendous task of either edu-
cating or arresting violators.
It has been seen that Labor had great difficulty with what
are termed "secondary boycotts" and elements aligned there-
"8See also, Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
682, and Note (1936) 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 125.
' Cf. Witte, Social Consequences of Injunctions in Labor Disputes
(1930) 24 ILL. L. REV. 772; Note (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 909.
'Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider v.
State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
=' While a member of the Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds
did not agree with this viewpoint and often dissented therefrom.
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with. No court has ever frowned upon a person's desire to quit
his employment and to refrain from patronizing his former em-
poyer or shops retailing products manufactured or distributed
by the former employer, so long as it is the employee himself
who does the quitting and the refraining.52 However, difficulty
arises when that employee attempts, by word or action, to per-
suade others, either in the employ of the same employer or not,
from working for or purchasing the products of that employer.
5 3
A secondary boycott is a combination not merely to refrain
from dealing with a person or to advise or by peaceful means
persuade his customers to refrain, but to exercise coercive pres-
sure upon such customers, actually causing them to withhold or
withdraw their patronage through fear of loss or damage to
themselves. It contemplates that A, upon the request of B and
under moral intimidation lest B boycott A, may be constrained
to withdraw his patronage from C while not really desiring to
do s, although B has a conflict with C to which A is not a
party.
,4
If workers have a right to tell the story of their strike and
working conditions to their co-workers and to the public, and
their Unions publicize organizing campaigns, the retail store or
other point of distribution of goods or services is the logical and
effective place to appeal to consumers, because there the consum-
ers are to be found. The distributor cannot be heard to object
because his sales of unfair goods are being curtailed, since the
wo rkers, through other advertising devices, may undoubtedly
seek to induce customers not to buy these goods.
The distributor will then claim that, by allowing the Union
to picket outside of his premises, even should it merely picket
the "unfair" product and not all products, 55 many consumers
"For a full discussion of this phase of the question see OAKES,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS (1927).
" This matter is broadly expanded upon in FRANKFURTER &
GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
" OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS (1927).
The secondary boycott may be applied against those supplying
the unfair employer with his needs, or against those to whom the
unfair employer sells his products.
.. "Unity of Interest" theory as expressed in Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937).
Finch, J. said:
"We do not hold more than that where a retailer is in unity
of interest with the manufacturer, the union may follow the
L. J.--5
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will refuse to patronize his store at all, even to buy the "fair"
goods. The courts answer this objection by showing that a con-
sumer may refuse to buy any goods in such a store even if he
learns of the controversy from an announcement made at a pub-
lic meeting or in a newspaper.5 6 If a consumer, knowing that
a retailer sells some unfair goods, would refuse to patronize him,
there seems no justification for interfering with the consumer
being told the truth.57
To deprive the workers of the opportunity to peacefully
appeal to the consumers at the most effective locus of persuasion,
the retail outlet, -would be a severe blow to Labor.n There ap-
pears to be no justification for cutting off this important type
of appeal to .the consumer who seems to be interested in the facts
coIucerning the production of goods. 50
CONCLUSION
In this part we have considered the questions forming the
backdrop of the stage; the setting upon which can be presented
not only the subject-matter of the weapon given by the Con-
stitutional guaranty of "Freedom of Speech and of the Press,"
non-union goods and seek by peaceful picketing to persuade the
consuming public to refrain from purchasing the non-union
product whether that is at the plant of the manufacturer or at
the store of the retailer in the same line of business and in unity
of interest with the manufacturer." (Emphasis supplied by the
Court.)
' Consumers' guides are published, giving information concern-
ing the labor conditions under which goods are produced. One such
publication obtained 50,000 subscribers in the first half year of its
existence. A great number of consumers are affected in their pur-
chases by labor facts.
" An analogous principle has been applied in New York in
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342; Wilson v. Pearce, 264 N.Y. 521, aff'g
240 App. Div. 718.
Also in the above connection, Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568, 20 N.E.
(2d) 969 (1939); New York Lumber Trade Assn. v. Lacey, 269 N.Y.
595 (1935).
Cf. Canepe v. John Doe, 277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E. (2d) 790 (1938).
Interesting on this general question is Weil & Co. v. Doe, 168
Misc. 211, 5 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 559 (1938). See Feldman v. Weiner,
173 Misc. 461, 17 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 730 (1940); Back v. Kaufman, 175
Misc. 169, 22 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 449 (1940).
,'Within the confines of the "Unity of Interest" rule, and the
boycott of only the "unfair" article.
" For a full discussion of providing labor information to the con-
sumers, Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 341, is very interesting.
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but al, the method by which the Supreme Court of the United
States has forged that weapon into a formidable one with which
to protect the right of Labor to peaceably picket.
We have taken under discussion herein the early judicial
dislike for organized Labor and the restrictions against Labor
resulting from these dislikes. We then arrived at the scene
where many of these dislikes were partially discarded, allowing
Labor practices to gain a degree of recognition. We next gazed
at the Labor legislation of the present century which attempted,
but sadly failed in the main, to safeguard all of Labor's gains
and rights. It was seen that some courts, nurturing a degree
of the former abhorrence for picketing, found loopholes per-
mitting them to still restrain such activities in numerous in-
stances and thereby thwart the intent of the legislatures.
The last item to be inspected was that of "handbill ordi-
iances.'" It was noticed that by the early and middle years of
the 1930s, the lower courts and the Supreme Court of the United
States struck down these ordinances in the name of the guar-
antie s of the Constitution.
Part II will center about the decisions of the S'upreme Court
of the United States concerning the right to picket and its
guaranty by the Constitution under the cloak of Freedom of
Speech. We shall see how this theory was expounded, broad-
Cued, severely narrowed, and then slightly broadened again.
(To CONTINUED IN Nov., 1945, KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL)
